

XX. CHRISTMAS EVE

Christmas Eve was quiet. The commanders and staffs took official notice of the occasion. To all of the CPs within Bastogne went a G-2 reminder from the 101st's chief joker, Col Danahy. It was a Sitrep overlay in red, white and green, the red outlining the enemy positions completely encircling the town and the green showing only in the words "Merry Christmas" across the position held by the defenders.(1)

MacAuliffe also rose to the occasion with an inspired communiqué in which he told his men about the German demand for surrender and his answer to them. The rest of his Christmas message read: "What's merry about all this, you ask? We're fighting—it's cold—we aren't home. All true but what has the proud Eagle Division accomplished with its worthy comrades of the 10th Armored Division, the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion and all the rest? Just this: We have stop-

Illustration No 28

ped cold everything that has been thrown at us from the north, east, south and west. We have identifications from four German Panzer Divisions, two German infantry divisions and one German parachute division. These units, spearheading the last desperate German lunge, were heading straight west for key points when the Eagle Division was hurriedly ordered to stem the advance. How effectively this was done will be written in history; not alone in our Division's glorious history but in world history. The Germans actually did surround us, their radios blared our doom. Allied troops are counterattacking in force. We continued to hold Bastogne. By holding Bastogne we assure the success of the Allied Armies. We know that our Division Commander, General Taylor, will say: Well done! We are giving our country and our loved ones at home a worthy Christmas present and being privileged to take part in this gallant feat of arms are truly making for ourselves a merry Christmas."(2)

What he said proved to be in every part a prophetic utterance though the quiet of Christmas

Illustration No 29

Eve did not hold for long.

The town was bombed twice. During the first raid in the late evening, a bomb landed on the hospital of the 20th Armd Inf near the intersection of the main roads from Arlon and Neuf-chateau. It caved in the roof, burying 20 patients and killing a Belgian woman who was serving as a nurse. Another bomb landed on CCB's headquarters, doing heavy damage and knocking down the Christmas tree in the message center. The men set up the tree again, and in an elaborate ceremony, one of the sergeants pinned the Purple Heart on a mangled doll.(2A)

Yet on the whole, the Eve passed without undue pressure from the enemy. The Journal entries of the separate regiments all use the word "quiet" in describing the period. It is a word completely at odds with the tumult in men's thoughts and emotions. Such was their reaction to the Christmas and to the memories surrounding it, that for the first time men all around the perimeter felt fearful. It seemed to them that the end was at hand. That night many of them shook hands with their

Map No 12

comrades; and they said to one another that it would probably be their last night together.

It was a phenomenon observed by many of the commanders, though they knew it had little relation to the tactical situation.(2B)[†]

In 502d Regt the officers were served Christmas Mass in the tenth century chapel of the beautiful Rolle Chateau which they were using for a CP(3) It was a happy occasion and well attended by the neighboring Belgians, who had rounded out the regimental messes with contributions of flour and sides of beef from their own stores.(4) The regimental officers turned in about 0130 on Christmas morning.(5) At 0245 there was an intense shelling of the forward area by the German artillery.(6) Lt Col Patrick J. Cassidy, 502d's Executive, called Capt Wallace A. Swanson of Co A who reported that his front had suddenly become active. But he added that the situation was obscure and he could not figure out what the Germans intended.(7) At 0330 Cassidy called Swanson again. Swanson said that the enemy was on top of him.(8) While they were talking, the line went out. Cassidy awakened Chappuis.(9)

Illustration No 30

Then all lines went out. Chappuis called 1st Bn by radio and told them to get ready to move, adding that their commander was to come to Rolle as quickly as possible.(10) By radio Chappuis heard from Swanson that the Germans were in Champs in large numbers and that his men were locked in a hand-to-hand and house-to-house fight with them. Major John D. Hanlon, CO, 1st Bn of 502d Regt, reported at the CP and was told by Chappuis to move Co B to the Champs road just west of Rolle and then get forward into Champs and help Swanson.(11)

While Swanson was becoming engaged, other German forces had filtered through the woods to the east of Champs on 2d Bn's left flank. After reporting it to regiment, Lt Col Thomas H. Sutcliffe shifted part of his force leftward against this threat. Chappuis supported his move by instructing Hanlon to send one platoon of Co B to the right and join hands with Co E. Hanlon called in at 0545.(12) He said the Germans were still fighting in Champs. He did not want to put the rest of his battalion into the village until it became

light as the darkness and confusion were such that it was almost impossible to distinguish friend from enemy. Chappuis told him to hold steady. As he and Cassidy estimated the situation, Co B was already backing up Co A and would still be effective if Champs was lost, whereas it might lose its reserve value if it pushed on into the village and the Germans came around it.(13)

They waited. They knew that somewhere a real blow was coming but they could not fathom where.(14) So far the pressure had jarred them only on their right and center and was coming at them from the north; they looked anxiously to the westward where their sector joined that of 327th Regiment. The CP was under heavy artillery fire and was no longer in either telephone or radio communication with Division.(15)

Just as the first light of Christmas morning broke, the S-2 of 1st Bn, 1st Lt Samuel B. Nickels, Jr, came at a dead run into the chateau. "There are seven enemy tanks and lots of infantry coming over the hill on your left," he said.(16) He had first sighted them moving along parallel to the

ridge southwest of Hemroulle; they were striking toward the ground where the two American regiments joined hands.(17)

The Rolle chateau was emptied almost before Nickels had finished speaking. Cooks, clerks, radio men and the chaplains collected under Capt James C. Stone, the Headquarters Commandant, and rushed west to the next hill.(18) From the chateau gate at Rolle, the road dips down through a deep swale then rises onto the ridge where it joins the main road into Hemroulle. The road line is on high ground all the way until just before Hemroulle where it drops down again to the village.(19) Stone's scratch force ran across the swale and took up firing positions approximate to the road and facing westward.(20) Within a few minutes they were joined by such of the regiment's wounded who were able to walk; Maj Douglas T. Davidson, the Regimental Surgeon (502/101) had run to the chateau stable which was serving as a temporary hospital, rallied his patients, handed them rifles and then led them out against the tanks.(21)

(21) They could see them coming on now. From the archway of Rolle it was about 600 yards to the first line of German armor. Chapp~~us~~^{ins}, Cassidy and the radio operator looked westward from the archway and could see just the outline of the enemy movement in the dim light. They were the only men now at the headquarters. (22)

Cassidy called Hanlon and told him to leave Co B where it was, get the company ready to protect its own rear and then try to face Co C to the west to meet the tank column as it came on. (23)

The 327th was already engaged. At 0500 Col Harper had heard by phone from Co A of his 3d Bn that 14 enemy tanks were formed for attack just east of Mande-St-Etienne. (24) At 0710 the enemy armor supported by infantry of the 77 Grenadier Regiment smashed through the positions held by Cos A and B. (25) In coming through two companies, the tanks fired all their guns and the German infantrymen riding the tanks

blazed away with their rifles. The spear-point of the German armor had already broken clear through to the Battalion CP. (26) At regiment Harper heard by telephone of the breakthrough, and on the heels of that message came word from Lt Col Cooper that his artillery already had the German tanks under fire. (27) At 0715 Col Allen, 3d Bn commander, called and said that the tanks were right on him.

Harper asked, "How close?"

Allen answered, "Right here! They are firing point blank at me from 150 yards range. My units are still in position but I've got to run." However, Allen had not been wholly taken by surprise. A telephone call had come from Capt Preston E. Towns, commanding Company C. He said to Allen, "Tanks are coming toward you." Allen asked, "Where?" Towns answered, "If you look out your window now you'll be looking down the muzzle of an 88." (28)

It was just then breaking day.. Allen stayed

Map No 13

at his CP only long enough to look out of his window, call Harper and tell him he was getting out. Then he ran as fast as he could go. The tanks fired at him as he sprinted toward the woods. He could see the muzzle blasts over his shoulder in the semi-darkness. All of the shots were leading him. The Germans were giving him credit for more speed than his legs possessed. Two members of the staff followed him. As they came out of the other end of the woods Chappuis' men along the ridge road saw them emerge and promptly pinned them down with heavy rifle fire. The three men then crawled back to the woods, circled south through a little valley and returned to Hemroulle. As they came out of the woods the second time, they were fired on by Col Cooper's artillerymen who had formed a skirmish line in case the enemy broke through the ranks. Allen was getting tired of it all and he waved his handkerchief vigorously until finally the gunners lowered their rifles and let the party come in. Harper, on getting the phone call

from Allen, realized that there was now no control over the battalion. So he sent his own S-3, Maj Jones, with his radio to Cooper's CP and its arrival there coincided with Allen's and he got through at once to the companies.(29)

In the meantime the forward line had held, partly because of the quick thinking of Capt McDonald of Co B. He had heard Allen's conversation with Harper over his own telephone and he at once called Cos A and C by radio. He said to them, "The Battalion Commander has had to get out. I can see you from where I am. Your best bet is to stay where you are. Hold tight to your positions and fight back at them."(30)

That was what they did. The main body of the German armor rolled straight through Co A's lines. 1st Lt Howard G. Bowles' (Acting CO of Co A) men stayed in their foxholes and took it, replying with their rifles and whatever weapons were at hand. After the tide of steel had passed over and through them, 12 men of the

Illustration No 31

company were dead and 20 lay wounded. But the survivors were up and fighting, and in the next round of the battle they captured 92 prisoners. (31)

Having crashed Harper's front, the German armor split as it came on toward the ridge and half of it swung north toward Rolle where Lt Nickels saw it and warned Chappuis in time for him to make his last-minute preparation. Companies B and C, 502d Regt, were even then in column of twos moving up the road toward Champs. (32)

Thus far Templeton's TDs had played only a minor part in the defense of the sector, but their best moments were approaching. Two of the guns had been of some assistance to Swanson in his fight for Champs. They were already in position there when the German attack got under way, one TD being in the center of Champs and another slightly to the west of it, so placed that it could cover the road to the southwest and the ridge to the north and northwest. Upon setting up, the TD crews manned four machine

guns on the ground around the centrally located guns. This position held when the German infantry closed on Champs and the TD force even spared a few of its men who went forward and aided the paratroopers in rooting the enemy out of the houses.(33)

Too, the heavy guns were used for close-up interdictory fire to keep the enemy from moving any deeper into the village. In this service, the 37mm guns, firing canister, were especially effective. Swanson got one of the TDs, under Sgt Lawrence Valletta, to go forward and blast a house where about 30 of the Germans had taken cover. Valletta moved right in next to the building, trained his big gun on the doors and windows and blew the place apart. He then shelled two more houses and returned to his original position. Just about dawn, he made a second sortie of the same kind.(34)

But to the southward of Champs where the crisis of the action was swiftly maturing, the TDs got away to a bad start and then staged a swift recovery.(35) Two of them from Co B of

705th Bn had been in 327th Regt's area and were out along the road which runs toward Grandes-Fanges from Rolle (this put them to the westward of Co C, 502d Regt) when the German attack came over the hill.(36) The TDs had at first gone into concealment behind a haystack and from there had engaged the enemy armor at a distance, knocking out two or three tanks.(37) Yet as the power of the German armor became more obvious, they decided to withdraw.(38) That was how it happened that they were moving back toward Rolle and were directly in line with the German tank fire when Co C of 502d Regt faced toward the enemy.(39) Both TDs were knocked out almost instantly.(40) The men of Co C saw them reel and stop from the enemy fire and realized that the loss of the TDs had helped spare them the worst part of the blow.(41) The encounter had had one other powerful effect—two TDs from Co C of 705th Bn were waiting in the woods behind Chappuis's infantrymen. The German armor, confident that it was now fully in command of the field, came on boldly against the infantry line.(42) Cassidy had sent a runner

sprinting toward the woods to alert the two concealed TDs. The same runner had been told to run from the guns to Capt George R. Cody's position and tell Cody that the TDs would be backing him up. But he didn't reach there in time.
(43)

The guns of the seven Mark IVs were already firing into Co C. About 15 to 20 German infantrymen were riding on the outside of each tank and some were firing their rifles. But the ground fog was bad and the fire was erratic. Cody turned his men about and told them to fall back to the edge of the forest. Without any part of the line breaking in a general dash for the rear, Co C fell back to the shelter of the trees and there took up positions and opened fire on the tanks with machine guns, bazookas, and rifles. Despite the surprise of the German assault, this movement was carried out with little loss and no disorder.(44)

Swiftly, there was a complete turning of situation as Co C's first volley took toll of the German infantry clinging to the tanks. The

dead and wounded pitched from the vehicles into the snow. As if with the purpose of saving their infantry, the tanks veered left toward Champs and the position held by Co B.(45) Until this moment the two TDs in the woods behind Co C had not fired a round.(46) But as the tank line pivoted and began to move northward along the top of the ridge, the flank of the German armor became completely exposed and the two TDs went into action.(47) So did Co B, which was now firing at the enemy front. Three of the Mark IVs were hit and knocked out by the TD fire before they completed the turning movement. One was stopped by a bazooka round from Co C a fifth tank was hit and stopped by a rocket from Capt Stone's group.(48) The infantry riding on the tanks were cut to pieces by bullet fire. As Co C's portion of the battle ended there were 67 German dead and 35 prisoners—many of the latter wounded—in the area around the ruined tanks.(49)

One tank broke through Co B and charged on into Champs. Company A fired bazookas at it and

it was also shelled by a 57mm gun which had taken position in the village. The tank was hit by both types of fire but which weapon made the kill is uncertain.(50) Capt James J. Hatch, Regimental S-3, had gone forward to reconnoiter Co A's situation and was in the CP at the time. He heard the fight going on outside, grabbed his pistol and opened the door. He was looking straight into the mouth of the tank's 75mm gun at a range of 15 yards. He closed the door, saying to the others, "This is no place for my pistol."(51) The seventh tank in the group—and it was later determined that this was the same tank which had knocked out the two TDs—was captured intact at Hemroulle.(52) By 0900 the action was cleared up around Rolle. Regiment had called Division and asked about the situation of 327th Regt over on its left. Kinard reported that 327th lines were generally intact and the situation there was well in hand.(53)

In the 327th's sector there had been four TDs behind McDonald's company and four behind

Map No 14

Bowles' company. Towns was unsupported by TDs but Harper had sent him two Sherman tanks on hearing that the German attack was coming.

(54) These guns, the bazooka fire of the glider infantry and the barrage fire of Cooper's artillery dealt in detail with that part of the German armor which tried to ride through toward Hemroulle after breaking Harper's front.

(55) The German tanks were fired at from so many directions and with such a mixture of fire that it was not possible to see or say how each tank met its doom. (56) One battery from the 463d Arty stopped two tanks at range 600 yards and then ran out and captured the crews. Seventeen German tanks had been seen on that portion of the front that morning and 17 tanks had ridden through the American infantry. When the fighting at last died there were 17 disabled tanks—many of them with fire-blackened hulls—scattered out through the American positions along the ridges running from Hemroulle to Champs. None got away. (57)

In 502 Regt, the wire maintenance men had

kept on working right through the fire fight and by 0900 the lines were again in solid. (58) None of the German infantry had managed an escape. (59) The few survivors, upon recoiling, were rounded^{up}/by the members of Allen's overrun battalion. The tankers died inside their tanks. Although Co C had been compelled to engage without artillery support because of the closeness of the action, its losses were negligible. It was put in position along the high ground west of the scene of the skirmish. Company A was getting Champs under control at about the same time that the Co C fight ended and was doing the last of its rat hunting through the village houses. Company B was put over to the eastward of Co A to fill out the line as far as the Second Battalion. In getting to this position it took heavy losses from enemy artillery while moving across the high ground north of Champs, but by 1500 the position was complete. Company A counted 98 Germans killed and 79 enlisted men and 2 officers captured in the Champs action. (60)

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 About ~~1400~~, Division moved Force Cherry out through Hemroulle to a position on the high ground along the edge of the woods to the southward of 502 Regiment. Cherry remained there until after dark to cover the restoration of 1st Bn's position. He then pulled back to Hemroulle. (61) A German field order captured during the morning fight showed that the mission which came to grief along the ridge south and west of Rolle had been given to the 115 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 15 Panzer Grenadier Division. Two battalions of the 77 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by the Division artillery of the 26 Volks grenadier Division, had implemented the assault against Champs and to the southward which preceded the Panzer advance. (62)

Christmas Day closed with Chappuis and Cassidy sitting down to a table spread with a can of sardines and a box of crackers. (63)

XXI THE RELIEF

On the morning of 26 December, the enemy renewed the pressure against the western side of the perimeter. But the attack was not pressed in real strength and the American lines held solid. Around the other parts of the defending circle, the day was relatively quiet though both sides intensified their air activity.

The intervention of the air directly hastened the hour when the siege was lifted through the arrival of the armored column from the south. Since 0600 on 22 December the three combat commands of the 4th Armored Division had been fighting their way steadily toward Bastogne by three separate routes from their assembly areas north of Arlon. They had met intense resistance all the way along the line and had taken heavy losses in men and tanks. By 1500 on 26 December, CCR had arrived at the high ground overlooking Clochimont and was preparing

to attack toward the village of Sibret. This put the command about four miles to the southwestward of Bastogne with their local objective about one mile to their own northwestward. As the attack was about to get underway, the men saw and heard what seemed to be "hundreds" of C-47 planes coming directly over them and bound for Bastogne. The spectacle encouraged Lt Col Creighton W. Abrams, commanding the 37th Tk Bn, and Lt Col George L. Jaques, commanding the 53d Armd Inf Bn, to make a break for Bastogne, disregarding their original mission. They believed that Sibret was strongly held. Abrams' force had been cut down to 20 medium tanks and Jaques' force was short 230 men. They figured that it might cost less to ignore Sibret and attack straight toward Bastogne.

At 1520 Abrams ordered his S-3, Capt William A. Dwight, to take a light team composed of tanks and infantry, break northeast to the village of Assenois and keep moving until he reached the Bastogne lines. The artillery with CCR—three battalions of 105mm~~s~~ and one battery

of 155mm hows—was directed to stand ready to place a concentration on Assenois as the team moved up to it. Such was the plan. In the execution of it, the commander of the leading tank called for artillery support as soon as he came within sight of the village. The guns poured ten rounds apiece against the target, concentrating their fire against the woods north of town and into an area in the southern edge of town where the enemy was supposed to be strongly fixed with antitank guns. CCR's shells were still dropping on Assenois when the first tanks moved in among the houses. There were some infantry losses from our own fire. In the smoke and confusion, the infantry company of Capt Dwight's team dismounted and engaged the enemy in a fight for the village. But five tanks and one infantry halftrack stuck to the letter of their assignment and kept moving toward Bastogne. However, three of the tanks had forged several hundred yards to the fore and the enemy strewed Teller mines between them and the remainder of the body as they were pulling out of Assenois. The halftrack hit a mine and was destroyed.

Capt Dwight jumped down from his tank to clear the other mines away, so that he could get forward with his two tanks. Meanwhile, the three lead tanks kept going and at 1650 1st Lt Charles P. Boggess, CO of Co C, 37th Tk Bn, drove the first vehicle from the 4th Armd Div to within the lines of the 326th Airborne Engineer Battalion.

This was the beginning. The siege was now lifted, though some days would pass before the American lines to the south were again firm. Dwight, having followed Boggess into Bastogne, radioed Abrams to come up with the rest of the breakthrough team. With them came Maj Gen Maxwell Taylor, commander of the 101st, who had flown back from the United States to join the division. Dwight then continued on to report to McAuliffe and arrange for the convoys to enter the town that night. Assenois was cleared by 2000, with the capture of 428 prisoners. Before morning, the woods on both sides of the road running north from Assenois were cleared sufficiently to assure relatively free use of this line of communication.(1)

Much hard fighting still remained for the other two combat commands of 4th Armd Div before they, too, closed to within the Bastogne perimeter. By their drive north, they had opened such an avenue to the south as would assure that the victory won by the Bastogne defenders could be fully exploited by the United States Army and its allies. The relief of Bastogne signaled the defeat of the German Army in the Ardennes offensive. But it had cost the 4th Armd Div a price comparable with that exacted from the defenders of Bastogne.(2) In the seven days during which its forces were moving to the relief of Bastogne the Division lost about 1,000 men. Its total medium tank strength at the end of the period was equal to the normal strength of one battalion.(3) As for what this victory—won by the defenders of Bastogne and confirmed by the force which relieved them—availed the allied cause, and as to how it influenced the emergency of December 1944, there is an official estimate from the command of 12th Army Group.

The After Action Reports for December 1944

says, "Pre-occupation with the key position of Bastogne dominated enemy strategy to such an extent that it cost him the advantage of the initiative. The German High Command evidently considered further extension to the west or north as both logistically and strategically unsound without possession of Bastogne, as that town overlooks the main roads and concentration areas of the spearheads. By the end of the month, the all out effort in the north had become temporarily defensive; in the west there was a limited withdrawal, and the array of forces around Bastogne clearly exposed the enemy's anxiety over that position. Until the Bastogne situation is resolved one way or the other no change in strategy can be expected."(4)

How well those words were sustained by the passage of events is now history.

FOOTNOTES

Interviews and other source material, cited in the footnotes by letter symbols (e.g. M31), are listed below. The interviews and excerpts from official records are deposited in the Historical Section, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

**101st Airborne Division Records for December
1944**

- AB1 - Annex 1, 101st Abn Div, L-450**
 - 1. G-1 After Action Report
 - 2. G-1 Journal 19-31
 - 3. Strength and Casualty Reports
 - 4. Chaplain Report
 - 5. Civil Affairs Report
 - 6. Surgeons Report
 - 7. Provost Marshal Report
 - 8. Post Office Report

- AB2 - Annex 2, 101st Abn Div, L-450**
 - 1. G-2 After Action Report
 - 2. G-2 Journal 19-31
 - 3. G-2 IPW Summaries
 - 4. G-2 Periodic Reports 19-31

- AB3 - Annex 3, 101st Abn Div, L-450**
 - 1. G-3 Journal 19-31
 - 2. G-3 Periodic Reports 18-31

- AB3A- 101st Abn Div SigO, L-450**
 - 1. After Action Report
 - 2. Radio and Traffic Diagram
 - 3. FO 1

- AB4 - Annex 4, 101st Abn Div, L-450**
 - 1. G-4 Report
 - 2. G-4 Journal
 - 3. Report of Air Resupply
 - 4. Administrative Orders

- AB5 - Annex 5, 101st Abn Div Arty, L-450**
 - 1. After Action Report
 - 2. Journal and File
 - 3. Maps and overlays

- AB6 - Annex 6, 327th GII Inf**
 - 1. After Action Report
 - 2. S-2 Periodic Reports

101st Airborne Division Records (contd)

3. S-3 Periodic Reports
4. S-1 Journal
5. S-2 Journal
6. Overlays. FO 2, Operations Memos

AB7 - Annex 7, 501st Procht Inf, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Overlays, FOs
3. Casualty Reports
4. Supporting Documents
5. Journal

AB8 - Annex 8, 502d Procht Inf, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Casualty Reports
3. Periodic Reports, FOs, Overlays
4. Journal

AB9 - Annex 9, 506th Procht Inf, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. S-2 Journal
3. S-3 Journal
4. Casualty Reports
5. Overlays, FOs, Periodic Reports

AB10 - Annex 10, 321st G1 FA Bn, L-450

1. After Action Report, Critique
2. Journal
3. Casualty Reports
4. Maps

AB11 - Annex 11, 377th Procht FA Bn, L-450

1. After Action Report, Critique
2. Journal
3. Casualty, Awards, etc
4. Supporting Documents

AB12 - Annex 12, 463d Procht FA Bn, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. S-2 Journal
3. S-3 Work Sheet and File
4. Periodic Reports
5. Overlays and Documents

101st Airborne Division Records (contd)

AB13 - Annex 13, 907th G1 FA Bn, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. S-1 Daily Reports
3. S-3 Daily Reports
4. Administration and Disposition Reports
5. Journal
6. Overlays and Maps

AB14 - Annex 14, 81st Abn AA Bn, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Casualty Reports, Awards, etc.
3. Overlays

AB15 - Annex 15, 326th Abn Engr Bn, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Journal
3. Casualty Reports and Awards, etc.
4. Periodic Reports, FOs and documents
5. Overlays

AB16 - Annex 16, 101st Abn Sig Co, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Casualty, Awards

AB17 - 326th Abn Med Co, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Casualty, Awards, etc.

AB18 - 426th Abn QM Co, L-450

1. After Action Report
2. Journal
3. Casualty, Awards, etc.

AB19 - 801st Abn Ord Maint Co

1. After Action Report

AB20 - 101st Abn Ren Plat, L-450

1. Narrative
2. Awards and Decorations

AB21 - 101st Abn Div, L-450

1. After Action Report and Maps

Interview Record, 101st Abn Div

The following interviews were recorded in Bastogne, Belgium, January 1945, (unless otherwise noted) by the historian indicated in parenthesis.

- M31 - Brig Gen Anthony C McAuliffe, Acting CG (Marshall)
- M32 - Lt Col H W O Kinnard, G-3 (Marshall)
- M33 - Lt Col Carl W Kohls, G-4 (Webber)
- M34 - Col Joseph H Harper, CO 327th Regt (Marshall)
- M35 - Lt Col Julian J Ewell, CO of 501st Regt (Marshall)
- M36 - Lt Col Steve A Chappuis, CO of 502d Regt and Lt Col Patrick F Cassidy, ExO, 502d Regt (Marshall)
- M37 - Lt Col Clarence F Nelson, CO of 907th Gl1 FA Bn (Marshall)
- M38 - Capt James E Parker, Air Control Officer (Westover)
- M39 - Lt Col Roy C Allen, CO of 3d Bn, 327th Regt, March 1945 (Westover)
- M40 - Pfc Elmer E Lucas, of 326th Med Det. This interview was held in Paris, France, April 1945 (Westover)

Interview Record, CCB of 10th Armd Div

The following interviews were recorded in Bastogne, Belgium, January 1945, (unless otherwise noted) by the historian indicated in parenthesis.

- M41 - Col Wm L Roberts, CO (Westover)**
- M42 - Ltr from Roberts to Marshall 18 February 1945**
- M43 - Lt Col Henry T Cherry, CO of 3d Tk Bn (Westover)**
- M44 - Lt Col James O'Hara, CO of 54th Armd Inf Bn (Westover)**
- M45 - Maj William R Desobry, CO of 20th Armd Inf Bn (Westover)**
- M45A- Narrative Summary of Operations of 4th Armd Div in relief of Bastogne 22-29 December 1944 (Clark)**

Interview Record, 705th TD Bn

The following interviews were recorded
in Bastogne, Belgium, January 1945, by Webber.

- M46 - 705th TD Bn with Lt Col Clifford D Templeton, CO
- M47 - 705th Supply
- M48 - 1st Plat Ren Co
- M49 - 2d Plat Ren Co
- M50 - 3d Plat Ren Co
- M51 - 2d Plat Co A
- M52 - 1st Plat Co B
- M53 - 2d Plat Co B
- M54 - 3d Plat Co B
- M55 - 2d Plat Co C
- M56 - 3d Plat Co C

Source Material (Record)

- S57 - 506th Frcht Inf Regt Narrative (8 Jan 45)
- S58 - Field Order 77 Gr R
- S59 - Diary Walcher (901 Pz Lehr)
- S60 - 501st Frcht Inf Regt Summary of Action (draft)
- S61 - 327th Gl Inf Regt Narrative (draft)
- S62 - Transportation Corps Narrative
- S63 - CCB 10th Armd Div After Action Report (5 Jan 45)
- S64 - CCB Journal excerpts
- S65 - Request for Citation for 3d Tk Bn
- S66 - 769th AAA (AW) Bn Journal (excerpts)
- S67 - 54th Armd Inf Journal (excerpts)
- S68 - 420th Armd FA Journal (excerpts)
- S69 - Team Husted Journal (excerpts)
- S70 - 333d FA Group After Action Report
- S71 - Third Army - Notes on Bastogne 15 Jan.
No signature, from Lt Col Hugh M Cole

Footnote on THE SITUATION

- (1)---The entire chapter is based on After Action Report, VIII US Corps, December 1944.

Footnotes on THE CONCENTRATION

- (1)---S71, 16 Dec 44.
- (2)---M41 and S64. Orders to pass IP were as of 171215 Dec but the actual passing was at 1320.
- (3)---AB21, Narrative, page 1; M32. The time of 0800 in the Kinnard interview is an obvious error for 2000.
- (4)---M46.
- (5)---This is the essence of the summary given in the Twelfth Army Group After Action Report for Dec 44, Par 13.
- (6)---S64, M41.
- (7)---M32.
- (8)---M32.
- (9)---M32.
- (10)---M32.
- (11)---M32, AB21.
- (12)---M32 and AB21. M32, in error, gives McAuliffe's objective as Bastogne. AB21 correctly explains the situation as it is described here. The facts concerning traffic in M32 agree with the known situation of AB21.
- (13)---S64, M41.
- (14)---S64, M41. The following troops were under CCB:

Hq & Hq Co, CCB
3d Tk Bn (-C)
54th Armd Inf Bn (-A,C)
Co C, 609th TD Bn (-1 plat)
Co C, 55th Armd Engr Bn
Co C, 21st Tk Bn
420th Armd FA Bn
Btry B, 796th AAA Bn
Trp D, 90th Cav Sq
20th Armd Inf Bn (-C)

The following teams were in operation:

TEAM CHERRY

3d Tk Bn (-B, 2 plat D)
Co C, 20th Armd Inf Bn
1 Plat Engrs
1 Plat TDs
1 Plat 90 Cav Sq

TEAM DESOBRY

20th Armd Inf Bn (-A, C)
Co B, 3d Tk Bn
1 Plat Engrs
1 Plat TDs
1 Plat Light Tks (Co D, 3d Tk Bn)
1 Plat D, 90th Cav Sq

TEAM O'HARA

54th Armd Inf Bn (-A, C)
Co C, 21st Tk Bn
1 Plat Engrs
1 Plat TDs
1 Plat Light Tks, Co D, 3d Tk Bn
1 Plat D, 90th Cav Sq

(15)---M42.

(16)---Historian's observation.

(17)---M42.

(18)---M33.

(19)---S62; AB4, Narrative, page 1; AB1. In the Strength Report for 18 Dec 44, the Effective Strength of the 101st Div is

listed as 805 officers and 11,035 enlisted men, a total of 11,840. The exact number who moved forward is not known as this total includes those not yet returned from pass and those who remained in Mourmelon to maintain the base camp.

(20)---S62, AB4. G-4's estimate of 2000 as the departure time is supported by the 327th After Action Report.

(21)---M32.

(22)---M31, M32.

(23)---M32.

(24)---M32.

(25)---M32.

(26)---M32.

(27)---M41.

(28)---M46.

(29)---M46.

(30)---M46.

Footnotes on TEAM CHERRY

- (1)---All the material from which this narrative is produced is based on the interview with Cherry. The records of Team Cherry were completely destroyed during the Christmas Eve bombing of Bastogne and there is no official record of his operation other than the interview and what Roberts had to say of Cherry's operation.
- (2)---By daybreak Hyduke was set up on three sides of Longvilly and ready to defend the rear. However, the closing of the road at Mageret by the Germans had kept many of CCR's vehicles from withdrawing and after taking to the road, they sat there, blocking all traffic. There was a heavy nebelwerfer shelling of Hyduke's lines in early morning and the area then quieted until 1000. The position was reasonably safe from frontal assault as the ground to north of the main road was marshy for ten yards while facing toward the marsh was an embankment much too steep for tanks to cross. On the right of the road the ground fell away too sharply for tanks. A large culvert a short distance ahead of the position was set for demolition. The morning engagement opened with the sighting of two enemy tanks about 1500 yards south-east of Longvilly but with the visibility so poor because of fog that they could be seen only in vague outline. A shot from the Germans hit a tank in the CCR group along the road, locking the turret. All of the American armor returned the fire and both enemy tanks went up in flames. After this there was a prolonged shelling of Longvilly. At 1300 the enemy armor put direct fire on Hyduke's position from front and left flank, disabling two half-tracks and one light tank at the tail of the column. Five minutes later the enemy knocked out two more medium tanks 150 yards

in front of the burning halftrack. An enemy AT gun on the left hit a CCR tank which had remained in position with the lone artillery battery; the battery then promptly took off. The groups on the road were now almost in a state of panic and when some of the vehicles tried to swing around the column, the road became more jammed than ever. One group of stragglers which had been organized to cover the left flank deserted their position, leaving that part of the ground to only 23 infantrymen of Co C. Hyduke had been given authority to take over any portion of CCR which withdrew but he found that it was impossible to do so. However, despite the panicky state of the stragglers he was able to maintain close control of his own force and continued to engage the enemy until 1330 when Cherry ordered him to fall back on Ryerson. The order couldn't be carried out. The road was absolutely blocked. Too, he couldn't order his men down from their vehicles because enemy foot troops were now moving in on his flanks and the whole area was under heavy bullet fire. Some of the tanks turned around on the road and tried to get back to the ground which they had defended. In this period of threshing round five of his seven light tanks were destroyed as well as one tank dozer and a tank recovery vehicle. The halftracks at the front of the column had to be abandoned and right after their personnel dismounted, two more medium tanks were hit by artillery fire. One medium tank became cut off and when last seen was trying to fight off an attack by German infantry. The last medium tank received a direct hit on its track as it tried to get out. The three remaining light tanks, including one which had belonged to an artillery forward observer were destroyed by their crews to prevent capture. By 1500 the survivors had escaped the scene of the wreckage and had joined Ryerson. That commander had had a difficult time carrying out his mission because of the traffic jam along the road but by 0945 his column had progressed to 300 yards east of Mageret. As his lead tank came

round the last bend in the road a shell from an enemy AT gun in Mageret hit it frontally, burning the tank and killing or injuring all members of the crew. The road ran through a cut at this point and the burning tank plugged it completely.

The stalled column then became a general target for intense shelling and small arms fire from the German armor and infantry force in the village. Ryerson's infantry then dismounted and proceeded forward to reconnoiter the enemy position. The high ground on both sides of the burning tank protected them for a little way but they could not go past the ridge because the down-slope was getting heavy bullet and mortar fire. Two 105mm assault guns maneuvered up to the ridge and shelled a tree line where they thought the German infantry was holding. The small arms fire from the village then slackened off a bit. From the rear two AA halftracks from the 9th Armd came on past Ryerson's force moving toward Bastogne. Ryerson's men tried to stop them but they drove on heedlessly until they turned the curve and saw the burning tank. The crews jumped for safety without trying to save their vehicles. The Germans shelled both vehicles and the road became blocked doubly. Next, the gun crews along the ridge saw an American command car and a Sherman tank, complete with cerise panels, whip out of Mageret and move north. They were quite startled for a moment and held their fire. By the time they had decided these vehicles were being used by the enemy, it was too late; they had moved out of range. Two batteries of the 73d Armd FA came up behind the column and on finding the road blocked they moved out north and west and proceeding via Bizory got into the line of the main American position. By about 1400 the fire from Mageret had subsided so appreciably that a force composed of 18 infantrymen, 2 medium tanks and a 105mm assault gun were sent against the village, moving through the fields on the right flank. One of the Shermans got hung up on an embankment, drew

a great deal of fire and returned to the column. The rest of the force worked its way into the northeast portion of the village, receiving some shell fire from the southeast of the village while so doing. At the main crossroads they could see a roadblock with one German tank and an American M IV. This armor did not move or fire and the party concluded that it was already destroyed. In the southern part of the village they could see two more German tanks, an American halftrack, a jeep and a German ambulance. The heavy guns with the party could not find a position from which to fire and the infantry could not do anything effective. From the rear of his column Ryerson was called by his AT officer, 2d Lt Earl B. Gilligan, and told that twenty halftracks loaded with men had just come in. Ryerson told him to get the men forward dismounted and send along any tanks that he might see. Gilligan got the men--about 200 stragglers, mostly tankers--out of the halftracks but only forty of them, with three captains and two lieutenants from CCR and a few officers from Hyduke's section, moved up toward the fire fight. The others fled across the fields to the north. The forty men were organized into four squads and at 1600 this force moved against the southeast part of the village, supported by a section of medium tanks. But the tanks could not get over the ground which lay south of the road and the men were not inclined to go far beyond the tanks. Within the village several of the German vehicles which had been to the south started to move north toward the main crossing. To the amazement of Ryerson's men, the German tank forming the roadblock, which they had thought to be dead all the time, suddenly came alive and moved out of the way. Ryerson's force had spent hours sitting within plain view of this tank at range 600 yards without receiving any attention from it. The American tank now put it under fire at once and the German tank burned. There was still so much shelling from the south of the village however that the American guns had to remain

immobile and the small force of infantry could not get forward. Prisoners which they had taken said that the enemy infantry group comprised about 120 men. The forty-man force which had attacked toward the south of Mageret had no communication with Ryerson's main body and later that evening somewhat less than half of them returned. They had made no real progress. Since noon Ryerson had been aware that infantry forces were coming to his aid from Bastogne. He didn't know what units were coming but the expectation of relief encouraged his efforts to take Mageret.

Footnotes on THE FIRST MEETING

- (1)---M35. Ewell told Marshall about this during their conversation. The two men had a close acquaintanceship extending back to the Normandy campaign. However Ewell was rated this way by all of his fellows. He mentioned his visit to Bastogne as a matter only of passing interest. It seems likely that this remarkable coincidence would never have been brought to light except that Ewell had to explain how he knew his own troops were on the wrong road initially. Ewell was badly wounded a few hours after the interview.
- (2)---AB3, M32. The order of march directed by McAuliffe was 501st, 506th, 502d, 327th with 81st AA Bn following 501st and 326th Engrs following 506th.
- (3)---M32.
- (4)---M32, M35.
- (5)---M32.
- (6)---M31, M32. The paragraph which follows this is from the Ewell interview.
- (7)---M35. Ewell was asked whether he told them and he said no.
- (8)---M32. This was the situation as Kinnard understood it to be and as he made note of it at the time. But it was not precisely the situation as it existed.
- (9)---M31.
- (10)---M31. The discrepancy between this and the preceding paragraph is a difference in Kinnard's and McAuliffe's understanding of the situation of the roadblocks. In

any case it is inconsequential.

(11)---M31. McAuliffe in his interview stated this very positively.

(12)---M31. His exact words.

(13)---M31, M35. Ewell felt that McAuliffe was looking for a general solution. McAuliffe used the phrase "good old Leavenworth solution" in talking to Marshall.

(14)---All of the interviews make this point obvious.

(15)---M35.

(16)---M35.

(17)---M35. Quoting Ewell exactly.

(18)---M35.

(19)---M31. McAuliffe's words were put down exactly as he said them.

(20)---M31.

(21)---M31.

(22)---M31.

(23)---M37.

(24)---M31, M35.

(25)---M35.

(26)---AB7.

(27)---AB7.

(28)---M31.

(29)---M37.

(30)---M35.

(31)---M35. The Historian's examination of the terrain verified this.

(32)---M35, AB7.

(33)---M35, AB7.

(34)---AB13, M37.

(35)---AB13, M37.

(36)---AB7, M35.

(37)---From the Historian's observation of the country.

(38)---M35.

(39)---M35.

(40)---M35. Ewell's words are quoted exactly.

(41)---M35.

(42)---M35. This was Ewell's impression of what happened and it was supported by his conversations with PWs.

(43)---On the day of the interview the building was hit and shelled repeatedly. In the Nunnery yards that morning a truck loaded with 200 mines was blown up. Not one particle of the bodies of the 12 men who were loading it could be found. Whether the truck had been hit by a shell we were unable to learn.

Footnotes on EAST OF BASTOGNE

- (1)---M35.
- (2)---M41, S63.
- (3)---M35. Ewell said he got better coordination
this way.
- (4)---AB7, M35. Ewell did not know of what had
befallen Team Cherry around Mageret.
- (5)---AB7, M35.
- (6)---AB2, M35.
- (7)---M35. Ewell said he had no prior knowledge
of this group.
- (8)---M44.
- (9)---M44, S64.
- (10)---M44.
- (11)---M44.
- (12)---AB7, M35.
- (13)---AB2, AB7, M35.
- (14)---M44, S64.
- (15)---M35.
- (16)---M35.
- (17)---M43.

Footnotes on HOLDING THE CHATEAU

- (1)---M43.
- (2)---As this is identical with Bottomly's estimate to Ewell it seems probable that men coming through gave Bottomly his information.
- (3)---Since the chateau was west of the German roadblock and the west wall faced toward Bottomly, this may have been American fire.
- (4)---There were supposed to be two engineer roadblocks in the vicinity, one between Bastogne and Neffe and the other at Mont. Ewell says that he found no engineer group on the Longvilly road. The Mont block was intact when Griswold got there. The group which came to the chateau may have been driven off the Longvilly road by the German fire and after going to the chateau decided to rejoin the other group. The Historian was not able to establish the fact.
- (5)---The work of this party was not known to Ewell and does not appear in the battalion journal. It appears in the CCB Journal and the Cherry interview and is confirmed in the Kinnard interview.
- (6)---Such is the confusion of battle that 101st CP had the impression that Cherry had burned the chateau before withdrawing in order to keep it from falling into enemy hands.
- (7)---S64.

Footnotes on TEAM DESOBRY AT NOVILLE

- (1)---M35. Roberts also expressed this view on the 28th Div to Westover, but it was not placed in the interview.
- (2)---M45, S64.
- (3)---M45, S64.
- (4)---M31. McAuliffe makes it plain that he ordered Ewell east just because he thought it would be a good move but that he sent LaPrade to Noville because of the situation of the armored force.
- (5)---M45, S57.
- (6)---M31.
- (7)---S57, S64.
- (8)---M45. This is not the construction placed upon the advance by the 506th Journal which says that McAuliffe told LaPrade to take command. The latter must be in error because McAuliffe says nothing of the kind and the facts are that he didn't have authority to put LaPrade in command.
- (9)---S57.
- (10)---M45.
- (11)---M45, S64. It is an interesting fact that 506th Journal has almost nothing to say about this conspicuous service done the regiment by Rice although the Journal does make reference to their acute supply situation. However, this is somewhat characteristic of forces acting in juncture.

Footnotes on ATTACK AND WITHDRAWAL

- (1)---M45, S57, S64.
- (2)---M45, S57, S64.
- (3)---M45, S57, S64.
- (4)---S57.
- (5)---M45, S57, S64.
- (6)---From S57, backed by statements made to Westover in an interview with battalion officers on 13 March 1945.
- (7)---There is a time discrepancy between the M45 and S64 with S57 at this point but darkness came early because of the bad visibility.
- (8)---506th claims that five of these tanks were destroyed but the statement is considered insufficient because proofs were lacking and in view of the conditions already described.
- (9)---M45.
- (10)---M45.
- (11)---From statement by Harwick to Marshall. This statement was never committed to writing because it was made in answer to a question prior to an interview which was to be held at a later hour. Before the interview could be held Harwick was hit.
- (12)---S57, S64.
- (13)---S57, S64.

(14)---S57.

(15)---From Harwick.

(16)---S57, S64.

(17)---M45.

(18)---M45, S57.

(19)---M31.

(20)---M31.

(21)---M31, M36, S57.

Footnotes on DOUBTS AND DECISIONS

- (1)---Examination of the assembly area overlay alongside of how the battle developed makes this fact self-evident. However there was considerable discussion between McAuliffe and the Historian which is not included in the notes. McAuliffe said that when the siege was over he felt that his choice of the assembly area was one of his most fortunate decisions and that he would not have altered it in any way looking at battle retrospectively. He said that he had not given a great deal of thought to the situation before making his decision but that he "felt" that the area selected was the right place.
- (2)---M31.
- (3)---M31, M32.
- (4)---M33. Danahy made a personal reconnaissance that night. Exactly what happened to the hospital company is not known because no men returned from the action.
- (5)---M32, S61.
- (6)---M32.
- (7)---M33.
- (8)---M33.
- (9)---M33.
- (10)---M32.
- (11)---M33 and confirmed by the statements of many other witnesses to the Historians.

- (12)---M41.
- (13)---M41.
- (14)---S64.
- (15)---M41, S64.
- (16)---M41, S64.
- (17)---After Action Report, 73d Armd FA, for
December 1944.
- (18)---After Action Report, 58th Armd FA, for
December 1944.
- (19)---When the newspaper correspondents at last
reached Bastogne this battalion received
more attention than all of the other
artillery combined.
- (20)---S41.
- (21)---S41.
- (22)---S41.
- (23)---S41. After Action Report, VIII Corps, for
December 1944, After Action Report, 4th
Armd Div, for December 1944.
- (24)---M41.
- (25)---M41.
- (26)---M41. Roberts said he was very sorry to
see these men go.
- (27)---M37. The substitute ammunition proved
quite satisfactory. According to Nelson
its close-up position enabled Baker Battery
to make more effective use of the M2 am-
munition. The observers had remained
with the forward platoons and this was true
of most of the Bastogne operation with the
result that casualties among forward ob-
servers ran very high. Nelson lost four
observers killed. Many of the missions
therefore had to be adjusted by infantry

observers and Nelson said that the results were generally excellent. Due to atmospheric conditions the greater part of the adjustments had to be made by sound. When observation permitted time fire was used with good results.

(28)---M37, but sustained by researches at all other points. Most of the supply points listed in VIII Corps' administrative Orders No. 39 and 40 of 18 December and 19 December were either in enemy hands or had been moved to the rear by the hour the orders were received. Corps radioed G-4 on one occasion that there were 7,000 or more rounds of 75mm how ammunition in the abandoned ASP No. 128. G-4 asked where that depot was located but never received a reply. On 20 December Capt Salve H Matheson, S-4 of the 506th Regt, drove to St. Hubert and to Bellauz in a fruitless search for small arms ammunition. Maj William C. Young, Div Arty S-4, reported that both the ammunition officer and the artillery officer of Corps said that the nearest ASP which had 105mm M3 ammunition was Audun le Roman, which is in the south of Luxembourg. Division also received the slightly ironic information that a train loaded with ammunition of all the types desired by 101st was being unloaded at Bertrix.

(29)---M33.

(30)---M33.

(31)---M33.

(32)---M33.

(33)---M41.

Footnotes on THE REPULSE

- (1)---M35. However, the Historian talked to perhaps a dozen of Ewell's officers to gather their general impression of how the stragglers acted and how the combat force reacted and all statements were to the same point.
- (2)---M35.
- (3)---M52, M53.
- (4)---M52, M53.
- (5)---M52, M53. This disagrees with Ewell's statement of force engaged but Ewell said he was uncertain of the facts.
- (6)---AB2.
- (7)---M52, M53.
- (8)---M35.
- (9)---M35.
- (10)---M52, M53. 501st had no record of when action ended.
- (11)---M35.
- (12)---M35, S60.
- (13)---M35.
- (14)---The Historian checked up on the location of these tanks.
- (15)---M35.
- (16)---From the Historian's examination of situation.
- (17)---Ewell was convinced that the presence of the TDs made this change.

- (18)---M52, M53.
- (19)---M35.
- (20)---M52, M53.
- (21)---M35, M52, M53, S60.
- (22)---M52, M53.
- (23)---M53, M53. S60 has no entry on this fact.
- (24)---M35, M52, M53.
- (25)---M35. The Historian's observation of the terrain verifies this.
- (26)---M32.
- (27)---One of these fights was more important than the others. During the period of the fighting at Noville and Neffe there had occurred an action between the flanks of 501st and 506th Regts which, while only a minor affair in itself, was to have an important effect on the general situation. When the two regiments moved out to their respective positions on 19 December, one going east and the other going north, they could not initially form a common front. In theory they were joined somewhere along the railroad track below Lahez but in fact there was a considerable gap between their closest elements. Each became so closely engaged in its local situation that the matter of contact was neglected. Col Sink was alarmed about the peril to his right flank from the beginning but it was not until late on the night of 19 December that Col Ewell fully shared his apprehension.

Company A of 501st was in reserve in a small wood just north of the quarry on the Neffe road, which made it the most rearward element in 501st's general position. Several hundred yards to its rear were the guns of 907th Bn's forward battery.

At 2300 a German patrol of 30 men came in between the company and the battery, moving from out of the northeast. A man on outpost duty for Co A saw the patrol and alerted the company. The patrol was permitted to come on. As it drew near the wood where the company had bivouacked, both the artillery and the infantry opened fire. The enemy dispersed into a nearby wood, though one member of the patrol was taken prisoner. Upon being interrogated he said that the patrol had come forward through the gap between the two infantry regiments and that its mission had been to get in behind the regiment and cut the Bastogne road. The incident gave the artillery grave fears about the security of their base and it also called Ewell's attention to the most vulnerable sector of his front.

Sometime on the morning of 20 December, after the Germans had attacked at Bizory and then sideslipped northward, Co A of 501st was attached to 2d Bn with the mission of occupying the woods south of the railroad and making contact with 506th Regiment. However, it did not proceed immediately on this assignment and during most of that day the effort to join with 506th was limited to patrol actions out of Co D, which was in reserve in 2d Battalion. Four times during the day patrols from Co D tried to move north along the general line of the road running to Foy. But they were always turned back from the vicinity of Halt, where the enemy had taken fire positions.

At the same time Co D of 506th Regt was pushing rightward toward the railroad station at Halt against stubborn resistance. When evening came the company had reached the Foy-Bizory road; it remained there with its right flank some hundreds of yards distant from the railroad station at Halt, which was held by an enemy force. There had been no contact with 501st Regiment. Colonel Sink called both 501st Regt and division and urged that 501st swing leftward to meet him. He said that his force was standing on the railroad line which was supposed to be the regimental boundary—but this overstated the case.

The first three patrols which had gone out from Co D of 501st to search for 506th flank had been turned back by fire from the Bois Jacques. They got no idea of the enemy strength in the forest area as they were beaten back by a scattering small-arms fire at long range whenever they moved to right of the Foy-Bizory road in an attempt to gain the railroad.

Corporal Frank Lasik of Co D led out his fourth patrol of the day just as the twilight came on. There were eight men with him and instead of beating over the same ground as the earlier patrols they swung around to the westward of the Bizory-Foy road. When within a short distance of the railroad Lasik dropped six of his men and continued on with two others. They reached the rail line and moved east along it to within a hundred yards of the Halt station. At that point they saw a force of seven German tanks supported by a body of infantry moving straight toward them down the railroad track, and only 75 yards away. Private Manzi fired one shot toward the enemy force and then the three men withdrew as rapidly as they could. Lasik knew that Co A had been given as assignment and was supposed to be moving toward the same ground which the Germans were approaching. He rushed to the Battalion CP and told them to get word to Co A that tanks were coming down the railway track.

That company had moved out about 1600 and was already engaged in clearing the woods which lay south of the railroad and west of the Foy-Bizory road. They found no enemy in the first wood and so they continued on to the next plantation lying south of the tracks and between them and the station at Halt. In the middle of this journey they met a patrol from 506th Regiment. Until that meeting they had believed that 506th was already on the railroad track. But from the patrol they learned that the flank was about 600 yards north of the railroad track and that Co D had been

having a running fight with small groups of the enemy for control of the station at Halt.

From the second woods, Sgt Lyle B Chamberlain was sent with a four-man patrol eastward along the tracks to search for the enemy. This was at just about the time that Lasik was getting back to warn the battalion. Chamberlain's patrol proceeded through the swampy ground which lay to the left of the tracks and had gone only a short distance when they sighted a German patrol coming toward them. It looked to Chamberlain like the point of a company. Darkness was already closing around them and the German group did not see Chamberlain's party. They fell back on the company and reported what they had seen. Hastily, the 3d Plat was deployed along the edge of the woods north of the railroad track to lay an ambush, as the enemy group which Chamberlain had sighted was all northward of the track. While the platoon was being deployed thick fog closed in around the woods and coupled with the darkness reduced visibility to almost nothing. The Germans were allowed to approach within 10 to 15 yards before Co A opened fire. This surprise opening volley wholly disorganized the leading German platoon and those which were not cut down ran rearward to the swampy ground. However, the whole company front had by this time become engaged. The enemy had been advancing with two companies abreast and astride the railway track. On the American right the 1st and 2d Plats did not get the same chance to close with the enemy at short range, and after the dispersion of the German right, mortar, grenade and automatic fire from their force south of the tracks beat heavily against the two platoons. Because of the darkness and the fog the men of the company could get no idea what losses they were themselves taking and could only judge the progress of the action by the build-up of the enemy fire. They saw little or nothing of the men they were engaging; the skirmish went on with both forces firing toward the flash and sound in the position opposite. (Company A lost 15 men in the night

engagement, 3 of which were KIA, but because of the conditions the men thought at the time that they were taking heavier losses.)

While the fire fight on the right of the tracks continued, the Germans who had fallen back toward the swampy ground on the left of the track gradually collected themselves again. For about one-half hour or a little more there was a lull in the action on this side except that both forces tried to carry on at long range with hand grenades. Then 3d Plat heard the enemy moving out through the woods around their left flank. Apprehensive that they would be outflanked if they maintained themselves in the forward ground, 3d Plat refused its own left flank to the westward so as to cover the rear of the company position. This change in the form of the enemy attack was also indicated on the right flank. Pfc William C Michel, a German-speaking soldier who was with the company executive, Lt Joseph B Schweiker, could hear the enemy shouting commands and telling his men to move out around the left and right of the American force. This may have been a ruse intended to cover a withdrawal, but as the fire fight began to build up again it seemed to Schweiker that the enemy was actively pushing out around his flanks and moving toward his rear. At about 2230 he ordered the company to fall back to the line of the second woods. Lt James C Murphy called all of the squad leaders together and told them that the signal for withdrawal would be a long burst of machine gun fire and that all of the other machine guns were to be kept quiet until this signal came. The withdrawal was made in reasonably good order, the circumstances considered.

When Co A took up its position in the second wood it was deployed to right of the railway line. The company was not pressed there at any time during the night. Apparently the Germans had ordered a withdrawal at about the same time. After staying in the woods for

somewhat more than an hour the company withdrew a little to the southward and bivouacked in a third plantation.

The advance of the enemy down the railroad track had put them on the rear of Co D of 506th Regt but it was not until 0400 that the latter, which was semi-engaged by small groups hitting directly at its front, discovered that its flank had been turned. Lt Col Strayer reported to Col Sink that he believed an enemy force of about two platoons had penetrated between him and 501st Regt; he did not know that Co D of 501st was meeting this force frontally. Sink ordered Co D of 506th to face some of its men toward the rear and hold their present ground. This, they did. First Battalion, which was then in reserve at Luzery, was ordered to send Cos A and C forward to help contain the penetrating force. Both of these companies were badly depleted from their fight in Noville.

When morning came the situation was about as follows; Co A of 501st which had not been disturbed during its bivouac, moved back without opposition to exactly the same positions which it had held during the night engagement. Company D of 501st, which had bivouacked just to the south of Co A's bivouac area under the mistaken impression that it had moved into the woods lying south of the railroad tracks, discovered its error when the light came. It immediately proceeded northward, with one platoon moving directly toward the objective woods and the others detouring east to clean out another small wood which they thought might contain enemy forces. Due to these accidental arrangements 501st Regt thus had forces advancing from west, southwest and south as if to bring about a general envelopment of the German force at the Halt station. Coinciding with these movements from the south and west the two reserve companies of 506th reached the area to the northward at about 0815 and were committed in companies abreast to beat through the forests lying south and

west of Co D's position. The morning was heavy with fog; none of these approaching forces moving in on them from northeast, north, west, southwest and south were visible to the Germans dug in around the Halt station and in some of the plantations to westward of it. They were so completely misled as to their own position that when the platoons which had marched east for Co D of 501st Regt started their sweep north toward the Halt station, several of the enemy glimpsed them through the fog and came walking up to meet them, thinking they were friendly troops.

The line of the 506th came slowly but methodically on toward the railway tracks. Some of the Germans stayed to fight. Others gave up. Still others, in trying to get away were forced back into the killing ground established by the semicircular advance of the 501st forces. By about 1100 the envelopment was complete and Cos A and C of 506th had made full contact with 501st along the railway line. The two companies were then ordered to return to Luzery, leaving Co D to solidify the front. But in moving south and westward through the forest they discovered that the job was by no means completed; the morning advance had forced many of the enemy into the woods to the westward beyond the lines of Co A 501st Regiment. The rat hunting continued throughout the day and it was almost dark before 506th was convinced that the mop-up operation was complete. By that time it was realized that the original estimate of two platoons of enemy—these were troops of the 77 Volksgrenadier Regiment of 26 Volksgrenadier Division—had far undershot the mark. The force was more nearly the size of a battalion. About 100 of the enemy were captured and 55 killed by 506th Regt in an operation which cost them only 5 or 6 casualties. Approximately 80 were driven into 501st's sector, where they were either killed or captured.

With the termination of this engagement, the sectors of both 501st and 506th Regts became relatively quiet until after 1 January.

It had other important consequences. Firm contact having been established between the two regiments, it was never thereafter broken or weakened. The Germans were served notice that the road to Bastogne from the east and north was not open. Out of these things developed a new feeling of confidence among the artillery positioned in Bastogne. They were now fully covered on the north and east by a reasonably strong shield and they could more easily direct their attention to the other parts of the defensive circle, wherever the danger mounted.

Footnotes on RUNNING BATTLE

- (1)---M45, S57.
- (2)---This is shown by his conversation with Chappuis as reported in M36.
- (3)---The Historian had several discussions with Sink, Ewell, Kinnard and others concerning the nature of the Noville position at the time when 101st attacked toward it in early January and this was the estimate which all concerned placed upon it.
- (4)---M36.
- (6)---M45.
- (7)---S57.
- (8)---M55.
- (9)---M55.
- (10)---M55.
- (11)---M45, M55, S57.
- (12)---M55.
- (13)---M45.
- (14)---Harwick witnessed this incident and gave this detail during his informal interview with Marshall which was not committed to writing.
- (15)---M45. Confirmed by Harwick's description to Marshall though Harwick also thought

that a TD came from the other direction and fired on the German tanks. In this he appears to have been mistaken.

(16)---M45.

(17)---Roberts told Westover about this but Westover did not make note of it at the time.

(18)---Harwick reported this to Marshall and at the same time he was telling Sink about it and was expressing his regret that he had lost some good men. He even named the men. However, the tankers did not report to Westover that they used any paratroopers at this time and therefore the facts are not confirmed by the armored people. It is notable all the way through these reports that both forces minimize the help received from the other group. In many cases that is not an oversight on their part but simply because they lacked information.

(19)---The armored people reported these impressions to Westover but he failed to write them down in his report. The facts are confirmed by S57.

(20)---M45.

(21)---M45.

(22)---M45, S57.

(23)---S57.

(24)---^SM57.

(25)---M45. S57 reports that the TDs did engage the German armor but there was no confirmation of this from among the TD people in connection with the opening fight at Foy.

(26)---S57.

(27)---M36.

(28)---M45, S57.

(29)---M45, S57.

(30)---M45, S57.

(31)---S57. In M45 the armored people they identified the location of the paratroop companies in a different order than this. All of 506th statements however are to the point that Co C led the column.

(32)---S57.

(33)---M45. This differs by a few minutes from S57.

(34)---M45.

(35)---M45.

(36)---M45.

(37)---M45.

(38)---M45.

(39)---M45.

(40)---M45. The S57 report of this whole episode is vague and confused. It is to be noted that both the infantry and the TD people reported that there was a German roadblock at Foy and that this was what checked the column. These forces were not up front and were not in position to see. The assumption was a natural one in view of the circumstances.

(41)---M45.

(42)---M45.

(43)---M45.

(44)---M45.

(45)---M45.

(46)---M45. Duncan was not in the jeep at the time and no one was injured.

(47)---M45.

(48)---M45.

(49)---M45.

(50)---M45.

(51)---M55.

(52)---M55.

(53)---M45.

(54)---M55.

(55)---M45.

(56)---M45.

(57)---M45.

(58)---M45.

(59)---M55.

(60)---M45.

(61)---S57.

(62)---The armored people put a lower estimate on the damage done to enemy armor than did the paratroopers and the figures given here are a compromise of the two. It is obvious that the nature of the battle was such that a completely accurate count could not be made.

(63)---As to the identification of enemy units in the Noville action the G-2 report shows that by the night of 20 December six prisoners captured in the Foy-Reconge area had been identified as coming from 2 Panzer Division.

(64)---Conclusion of the historians after studying
the entire Noville fight.

Footnotes on FIRST ACTION AT MARVIE

- (1)---M44.
- (2)---S64.
- (3)---S64. This entry was made between 0630 and 0700.
- (4)---M34.
- (5)---M34.
- (6)---M34.
- (7)---M34.
- (8)---M44, made from O'Hara's journal. There was no time entry in 327th Journal covering this incident. Harper had the impression that it occurred much earlier in the morning.
- (9)---M34.
- (10)---M44.
- (11)---M44.
- (12)---M34.
- (13)---M44.
- (14)---M34.
- (15)---M34, M44.
- (16)---M34, M44.
- (17)---M34.
- (18)---M34.

(19)---M34.

(20)---M34 and supported by Historian's research
through all Bastogne actions.

(21)---M34.

(22)---S61.

(23)---M44.

(24)---M34.

(25)---Comment by the Historical Officers.

Footnotes on THE RESPITE

- (1)---This is perhaps an over-simplification. There were fairly heavy attacks against the north on 21 December and one running engagement in the southwest but the failure of the enemy to press a general attack against the Bastogne defenses during the two days is conspicuous.
- (2)---The movement of the forces is outlined in the G-2 overlays.
- (3)---M31. The precise hour of the cutting of the Neufchateau road is not known and the statement on which this paragraph is based is taken from the McAuliffe interview.
- (4)---M31. Quoted directly. According to an interview with Col Walter C Stanton, Deputy Chief of Staff, VIII Corps, Gen Middleton never weakened in his desire to hold Bastogne. On the 19th, however, Lt Gen George S Patton, Jr, CG of 3d US Army, ordered a withdrawal. Stanton believed this order was possibly influenced by the weak showing of First US Army. The Corps order appeared on 20 December. Interview by Capt L B Clark, 3d Information and Historical Service, and Capt K W Hechler, 2d Information and Historical Service, 16 January 1945, vicinity Assenois, Belgium.
- (5)---M31.
- (6)---M31.
- (7)---M31, but confirmed by other members of the staff who were present. This exchange of words however does not appear in Westover interview with Roberts.

- (8)---The conversations of the Historical Officers with members of both commands indicated this to be the case.
- (9)---M32.
- (10)---M31.
- (11)---M41.
- (12)---M41, S64.
- (13)---This conclusion is supported by the proof that air resupply of the Bastogne position immediately became a foremost concern of Corps and that it labored throughout 21 December to make the operation possible.
- (14)---M31.
- (15)---M31. McAuliffe says specifically that from the moment he reached Bastogne he expected to get cut off because there seemed to be nothing in front of him which would prevent it.
- (16)---It is notable that 22 December was the least active day on the Bastogne front.
- (17)---AB2.
- (18)---AB2.
- (19)---AB2.
- (20)---This detail is almost overlooked in all of the journals.
- (21)---AB2.
- (22)---Kinnard and Danahy both stated to Marshall that from their examination of Corps' situation maps upon reaching Bastogne they learned practically nothing of the enemy situation and decided they would have to build from the ground up.
- (23)---AB2, M32.

(24)---This message was received by Kinnard and appears in the interview with him. The exact reason for it being sent however is not known.

(25)---AB2, M32. Danahy was convinced that while using every strategem possible the enemy was trying to keep within the appearance of acting according to the laws of war for the purpose of protecting its personnel. He said that the prisoners taken in American uniforms said they had put on this extra clothing to keep from freezing.

(26)--- AB2

(27)---AB2.

(28)---AB2.

(29)---M41.

(30)---M41.

(31)---M41.

(32)---Westover's estimate of the position covered.

(33)---AB2.

Footnotes on THE SECOND MARVIE ATTACK

- (1)---M34, S61.
- (2)---M34, S64. On the afternoon of 20 December a small task force under 1st Lt Richard C Gilliland was sent to support 327th along the line covering the main highway. It was called Charlie 16 and included three tanks--two 75mm and one 76mm. It remained away from the main group for a week, lost the 76mm tank from a rocket, engaged in 15 skirmishes and destroyed much enemy equipment.
- (3)---S60, S61.
- (4)---S60.
- (5)---M34, S60, S64.
- (6)---M34.
- (7)---M44, S64.
- (8)---M34, S61.
- (9)---This is not the Historian's conclusion but is based on the Harper interview and on statements by Templeton and Harper's battalion commanders. Harper said, "Most of the time when our troops were under shell fire the German gunners were in position to lay directly on the target."
- (10)---M34. The battalion commander was present while these facts were reconstructed.
- (11)---M34.
- (12)---M44.

(13)---M34, S61.

(14)---M44. Harper later had this to say of what happened to Morrison, "I'll never again put infantry on a forward slope unless I have TDs or tanks where I can protect them. I lost two platoons separately in defense of the perimeter by making this mistake. In each case they were overrun when there were no TDs to defend them."

(15)---M44.

(16)---M44.

(17)---This incident was related during the Harper interview and supported by the battalion commander. It was not brought to light however during Westover's conversations with O'Hara's force.

(18)---M34, M44.

(19)---M44.

(20)---M34.

(21)---M34.

(22)---Morrison's body was not found and it was hoped that he was taken prisoner. Both Harper and Rouzie recalled the words of the conversations.

(23)---M34.

(24)---M34, M44.

(25)---M44.

(26)---M44.

(27)---M34, S61.

(28)---M44.

(29)---M44.

(30)---S61, S64.

- (31)---M34.
- (32)---M34.
- (33)---This general estimate of situation is supported by all the records and interviews.
- (34)---S57, S61.
- (35)---M34.
- (36)---M34.
- (37)---M34.
- (38)---M34.
- (39)---M34, S61.
- (40)---M34.
- (41)---M34.
- (42)---M34. Adams' CP was on the west side of the Bastogne road across from Smith's.
- (43)---M34.
- (44)---M34.
- (45)---M34.
- (46)---M34.
- (47)---M34.
- (48)---M34. The CCB sources did not have this information.
- (49)---M34.
- (50)---M44.
- (51)---M44.
- (52)---M44. O'Hara made thorough search in the interests of identification.

(53)---M34.

(54)---M44, S64.

(55)---M34.

(56)---M34.

(57)---M34, M44.

(58)---M34, M44.

(59)---M34.

(60)---S61.

(61)---S61.

(62)---M34.

Footnotes on THE LOW EBB OF SUPPLY

- (1)---M31. McAuliffe says that 23 December was the day of crisis. In this he appears to be mistaken. The artillery commanders all said that it was on the afternoon before that they were most worried about their supply. This checks with the fact that resupply began to arrive fairly early the next morning.
- (2)---M31.
- (3)---From the Marshall interviews with Lt Col John T Cooper, Jr, and Col Nelson and from McAuliffe's statement on the employment of his artillery.
- (4)---M36. Also interview with Col Sink and others.
- (5)---From the Cooper interview.
- (6)---M31.
- (7)---M31.
- (8)---M31. McAuliffe recollected this as happening on 23 December. Kinnard said it happened on 22 December. This latter date appears to be correct inasmuch as resupply became assured on the morning of 23 December. There is no doubt however about the validity of this quotation. Kinnard and Danahy both heard it and when his memory was refreshed McAuliffe recalled that he had said it.
- (9)---M32, S61.
- (10)---Westover was impressed by this difference in how the little units looked at the

operation as compared with the Division viewpoint. The observation was made on the basis of Westover's findings as contrasted with Marshall's.

(11)---M31.

(12)---This comes from the statement of many of the officers through Westover.

(13)---M31.

(14)---M33.

(15)---M33.

(16)---M33.

(17)---M33.

(18)---M33.

(19)---M33.

Footnotes on ARRIVAL OF SUPPLY

M33 is the source of this material.

Footnotes on IMPROVING SITUATION

- (1)---This conclusion is based upon all of the evidence from the Noville, Marvie and Neffe engagements.
- (2)---M38.
- (3)---Facts speak for themselves.
- (4)---M38.
- (5)---S57.
- (6)---S57.
- (7)---This conclusion is drawn from numerous conversations the Historians had with front line troops.
- (8)---M42.
- (9)---M42.
- (10)---M42:
- (11)---M31, M41.
- (12)---M31, M41.
- (13)---M31, M41.
- (14)---M31, M41.
- (15)---M41. The two organizations were the 755th and part of 333d FA Group.
- (16)---M41.
- (17)---From Roberts, McAuliffe and all others who were interviewed however the affirming statements are found in the interviews of the two commanders.

- (18)---M42.
- (19)---M42.
- (20)---M42.
- (21)---M32.
- (22)---M32, M41.
- (23)---This note is added by the Historian. He was present on a number of occasions when officers in these different organizations discussed this proposition quite seriously.
- (24)---M42.
- (25)---M42.
- (26)---M42.
- (27)---M42.
- (28)---M42.
- (29)---M42.
- (30)---This happened at Champs among other places.
- (31)---The Historical Officer makes this as a personal observation as he was present at a number of conferences where Templeton was taking a strong position.
- (32)---This is also an observation made by the Historical Officer as an eye witness.
- (33)---M42.
- (34)---M42.
- (35)---M38.
- (36)---M31. As for the extent of the enemy build-up in the northwest Chappuis says in the 502d interview that the most trying feature of those days on his troops

were that they had to look out every day and see enemy trucks and individuals swarming up and down the roads all around them. He said, "We could have murdered those Germans. The road intersections in front of us looked like 42nd and Broadway after a football game. Most of the traffic seemed to be moving to the west. They were in easy reach and were quite contemptuous about it. But we could do nothing about it because we did not have the artillery ammunition."

(37)---M38.

(38)---M35.

(39)---M38.

(40)---M38.

(41)---M38.

(42)---M38.

(43)---M38.

(44)---M41.

(45)---M31.

(46)---M31.

Footnotes on WEST OF BASTOGNE

- (1)---M32.
- (2)---M34.
- (3)---M32.
- (4)---M39.
- (5)---M34.
- (6)---M36.
- (7)---M36.
- (8)---M36.
- (9)---M56.
- (10)---M36.
- (11)---M36.
- (12)---M36.
- (13)---M36.
- (14)---M36.
- (15)---M39.

Footnotes on CHRISTMAS EVE

- (1)---AB2. Danahy did this because he thought it would boost morale. It proved so popular with the commanders that many additional copies were printed to obtain a more general distribution.
- (2)---This document is in the historical file.
- (2A)---S63, S64.
- (2B)---Ewell, among other commanders, commented on this in the second interview. Many of the men spoke of how fearful they felt on Christmas Eve.
- (3)---M36.
- (4)---M36.
- (5)---M36.
- (6)---AB8.
- (7)---AB8.
- (8)---AB8.
- (9)---M36.
- (10)---AB8.
- (11)---M36.
- (12)---AB8.
- (13)---M36.
- (14)---M36.
- (15)---AB8, M36.

(16)---M36.

(17)---M36.

(18)---M36.

(19)---From the Historical Officer's observation
of the ground.

(20)---M36.

(21)---M36.

(22)---M36.

(23)---M36.

(24)---M36.

(25)---AB2, M34.

(26)---M34, M39.

(27)---M34.

(28)---M34.

(29)---M34.

(30)---M34.

(31)---M34.

(32)---M36.

(33)---M49, M50, M56.

(34)---M49, M50, M56.

(35)---M34, M36, M49, M50, M56.

(36)---M36, M49, M50, 136.

(37)---M49, M50, M56.

(38)---M49, M50, M56.

(39)---M36.

- (40)---M36.
- (41)---M36.
- (42)---M36.
- (43)---M36.
- (44)---M36.
- (45)---M36.
- (46)---M36. Cassidy and Chappuis were in a position to observe the relationship in time of the TD fire to the rest of the action.
- (47)---M36. The TD account of this episode is not well rounded out but the crew were not in position to see the action clearly.
- (48)---M36. This is 502d's report of the detail. The TDs themselves claim credit for a greater number of hits.
- (49)---M36.
- (50)---M36.
- (51)---M36.
- (52)---M49, M50, M56.
- (53)---AB8.
- (54)---M34.
- (55)---M34.
- (56)---M34, M39.
- (57)---M34. All hands agreed that this was the case.
- (58)---AB8.
- (59)---M36.
- (60)---M36.
- (61)---M36, S64.

(62)---Copy of Field Order is in historical file.

(63)---M36. This was the high tide of the German attack against the 502d Regiment. First Battalion was again attacked and on 27 December was driven off the hill briefly. By that time Division had been joined by the force from the south. During 26 December 502d continued to maintain an all-around defense of the position. Six prisoners were taken near Champs.

Footnotes on THE RELIEF

- (1)---These extracts are made from the comprehensive narrative on 4th Armd Div's operation done by Capt L B Clark and based upon the journals of that organization.
- (2)---The casualties of 101st Div up to 6 January 1945 in the Bastogne operation were as follows:

	Officers	Enlisted Men
Killed	29	312
Wounded	103	1588
Missing	<u>34</u>	<u>482</u>
	166	2382

The artillery losses were extremely light except among forward observers. The engineer battalion lost 26 enlisted men and one officer killed and 84 enlisted men wounded up to 6 January. Due to the capture of the hospital the 326th Med Co showed the largest number of missing of any unit at Bastogne, with 125 gone. There was a surprisingly even distribution of losses among the infantry regiments:

	327th		501st		502d		506th	
	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM	Off	EM
Killed	2	60	9	68	8	66	5	67
Wounded	13	279	29	477	22	246	28	359
Prisoners	Total		-		981			
Estimated Enemy Killed					7000			

- (3)---From the narrative by Clark.
- (4)---From the Twelfth US Army Group After Action Report for December 1944.

SITUATION MAPS

Map No 15
Situation 19 December 1944

Having broken through the 28th Inf Div and overrun the roadblocks of CCR, 9th Armd Div on the 18th, the enemy attacked Bastogne directly. The main assaults came by the three main roads from the northeast and east. The enemy was halted at Noville by Team Desobry and 506-1, in the east by 501st and near Wardin by Team O'Hara.

Map No 16
Situation 20 December 1944

The enemy attack continued on the northeast and east. The forces at Noville were bypassed and had to be withdrawn when the enemy struck at Foy. 327-2 arrived in time in Marvie to join O'Hara in repelling the enemy who had advanced beyond Wardin. During the night 501st was heavily engaged between Bizory and Mont. The Neufchateau Road was cut—Bastogne encircled.

Map No 17
Situation 21 December 1944

The enemy found that the approaches to Bastogne by the northeast and east were well held. The encirclement continued and activity in the west indicated the enemy's intention to strike there. Positions were consolidated. A heavy snow blanketed the countryside.

Map No 18
Situation 22 December 1944

Illustration No 32

Through No 44

Exhibit

The front remained relatively quiet; the enemy demanded the surrender of the city. Small attacks were received in the south and west. The 4th Armd Div began its drive to relieve the city.

Map No ~~18~~ 19
Situation 23 December 1944

Clear weather brought air support and resupply for the besieged city. Marvie was attacked during the evening and the enemy entered the town. Reinforcements and a last-ditch stand saved the position in the south.

Map No ~~19~~ 20
Situation 24 December 1944

Air support and resupply were again given the garrison but enemy bombers were active the day and night. Small attacks in the north and west were repelled.

Map No ~~20~~ 21
Situation 25 December 1944

An artillery concentration, followed by an infantry attack, struck Champs early in the morning. Tanks penetrated the 327th line in the west. Both forces were overcome in hard fighting during the day. Fighter support was present, but no air resupply was received.

Map No 22
Situation 26 December 1944

After hard fighting and heavy losses the 4th Armd Div broke through the enemy positions in the south and entered Bastogne at 1650.

Captions for ILLUSTRATIONS

(1)---Major General Troy H Middleton, CG,
VIII US Corps.

infantry (2)---The main street of Bastogne from the
Monastery Command Post of the 501st Para-
chute Regiment. The cold and snow made
movement difficult and living uncomfort-
table.

(3)---Colonel William L Roberts, CO, CCB, 10th
Armored Division.

(4)---Brigadier General Anthony C McAuliffe,
Acting CG, 101st Airborne Division,
during the siege of Bastogne.

(5)---Lieutenant Colonel H W O Kinnard, G-3,
101st Airborne Division.

(6)---Paratroopers entrucking at Camp Mour-
melon, France, 18 December 1944 to move
to Bastogne.

(7)---Brigadier General Gerald J Higgins,
Assistant Division CG, 101st Airborne
Division.

(8)---Colonel Julian J Ewell, CO, 501st Para-
chute Infantry Regiment.

infantry (9)---The village of Neffe. Early in the morn-
ing of the 9th December the enemy cap-
tured this crossroads town. During that
day the position was held against the
501st Parachute Regiment. The Neffe
Chateau is in the clump of trees on the
right; the road to the left leads to
Bastogne.

- (10)---A 105mm M3 howitzer being fired by members of the 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion during the siege of Bastogne.
- (11)---501st Parachute Regiment Command Post in the Bastogne Monastery. *Infantry*
- (12)---The Bastogne Road entering the outskirts of Mont.
- (13)---Neffe, scene of heavy fighting by 501 and Team Cherry, after it was recaptured.
- (14)---Wounded in the hospitals of Bastogne had to lie on the floors because of lack of equipment.
- (15)---A trailer is loaded with parachutes for use in the improvised hospitals in Bastogne.
- (16)---Armored engineer sentries waiting to go on post.
- (17)---A 75mm M1A1 howitzer being fired by paratroop artillerymen during the siege of Bastogne.
- (18)---On the night of 20th December, the enemy struck at the left flank of the Third Battalion, 501st Parachute Regiment. This scene from the outskirts of Neffe shows the enemy preparing for the attack. The American position is on the crest of the hill to the left. The little village of Mont is in the center draw and the barbed wire fences, so costly to the enemy, are to the right of the pine grove. *Infantry*
- (19)---Lieutenant Colonel Paul A. Danahy, G-2, 101st Airborne Division.
- (20)---Command Post, Company F, 327th Glider Regiment, near Remoifesse. Here the German officer demanding the surrender of Bastogne were blindfolded before being taken to the 101st A/B Division Command Post. In the center are Colonel Harper and Major Jones exchanging salutes with the German officers as they were returned to their lines. *Infantry*

- (21)---Bomb damage in Bastogne.
- (22)---The Bastogne Barracks--location of the 101st CP. The C-47s have just dropped their supply bundles.
- (23)---Medicine, food and ammunition being dropped from C-47s to the defenders of Bastogne.
- (24)---Members of the 101st bring in a supply bundle. Recovery ran as high as 95% and the bundles were utilized immediately.
- (25)---This 155mm M1A1 howitzer has just received ammunition from the glider in the background. This incident occurred during the siege of Bastogne.
- (26)---Danahy's Christmas card--a G-2 situation overlay in blue, red and green.
- (27)---German propaganda leaflet (two sides) fired by artillery shell into the American lines on Christmas Eve.
- (28)---Bomb damage in Bastogne.
- (29)---The chateau at Rolle--CP of the 502^d Parachute Regiment. *1 Infantry*
- (30)---Bazooka position in the 502^d Parachute Regiment area. It was over this terrain on Christmas Day that enemy tanks moved on Rolle. The enemy tank in the foreground was destroyed on that occasion. *Infantry*
- (31)---Having broken through the position of the Third Battalion, 327th Glider Regiment, enemy tanks came across the hills to the left on Christmas Day to attack Champs and Rolle. The road moving to the right leads to Champs. Paralleling the second row of trees a road goes to the village of Rolle. Company C, 502^d Parachute Regiment was attacked while marching along the center road, then fell back to join TDs at the trees in the foreground. From this position many enemy tanks were destroyed. *1 Infantry*

- (32)---Men waiting in the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment CP.
- (33)---The underground Message Center of the 101st Abn Division in Bastogne.
- (34)---Danahy, McAuliffe, and Kinnard.
- (35)---Major General Taylor confers with other officers of his division. They are Major James J Hatch, 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment, Brigadier General Higgins, and Colonel Robert Sink, CO, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment.
- (36)---Lieutenant General George S Patton talking with Brigadier General McAuliffe and Lieutenant Colonel Steve Chappuis after he has awarded these officers the DSC for their actions in the defense of Bastogne.
- (37)---Camouflaged vehicle in Bastogne. Sheets from village homes were put into use.
- (38)---A column of men marching in the vicinity of Bastogne. The rolling ground and pine forest are typical of Bastogne.
- (39)---Typical Ardennes countryside between Bastogne and Wiltz.
- (40)---Men on guard in a pine plantation near Bastogne.
- (41)---Security guard of the 101st near the 502d Parachute Infantry Regiment CP.
- (42)---Memorandum receipt given by Major General Middleton to the 101st for holding Bastogne.
- (43)---German propaganda leaflet (four sides) fired by artillery shell into the American lines during the siege of Bastogne.
- (44)---Pine plantation near Bastogne, typical of the terrain in which the 101st fought. Every forest was a defensive island.